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No Longer Just A Victim: The Impact Of Victim Participation On 
Trial Proceedings At The International Criminal Court 
 
Abstract 
 The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court adopted an innovative 
participatory role for victims hailed as a major step towards recognising the rights of 
victims in international criminal proceedings. However, it is unclear whether direct 
participation has resulted in a more productive role for victims. This article discusses 
the goals of trial, focusing on the victims’ interests and the interests of the 
International Criminal Court; the statutory and jurisprudential rules pertaining to 
victims’ participation at the Court; and the testimony of witnesses questioned by the 
victims’ representatives in the Lubanga and Katanga trials.  The article concludes that 
the victims’ representatives in Lubanga and Katanga achieved some of the goals of 
trial but had a more limited impact on others.  It also warns that the International 
Criminal Court needs to continue to protect the rights of the victims and ensure that it 
does not improperly limit their participation. 
Keywords:  victim participation, International Criminal Court, witness 
testimony 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 Introduction 
 Until the adoption of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
(“Rome Statute”) in 1998, the only role available to victims in international criminal 
proceedings was that of witness.1 Described by numerous commentators as “one of 
the major innovations and achievements” of the Rome Statute, the ability of victims 
to actively participate in proceedings “exceeds what is allowed in most countries, 
even in civil law jurisdictions where victims can often initiate a criminal 
proceeding.”2 Now that the Court has been in operation for more than thirteen years it 
is reasonable to ask the following questions: has the participatory role of the victims 
had any effect on the achievement of the court’s trial goals? If so, is that contribution 
greater than it would have been had the victims simply acted as witnesses?   
 Article 68 of the Rome Statute provides the victims with rights previously 
unknown in international criminal law. Article 68(3) allows for the “views and 
                                                        
1 Salvatore Zappalà, ‘The Rights of Victims vs. the Rights of the Accused’, 8 Journal of International 
Criminal Justice (2010) 137-164, 137. 
2 Lucia Catani, ‘Victims at the International Criminal Court: Some Lessons Learned from the Lubanga 
Case’, 10 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2012) 905-922, at 906; Jens David Ohlin, ‘Meta-
Theory of International Criminal Procedure: Vindicating the Rule of Law’, 14 UCLA Journal of 
International Law and Foreign Affairs (2009) 77-120, 99; Sergey Vasiliev, ‘Article 68(3) and Personal 
Interests of Victims in the Emerging Practice of the ICC’, in Carsten Stahn and Göran Sluiter (eds.), 
The Emerging Practice of the International Criminal Court, (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden, 
2009) p. 635; Emily Haslam, ‘Victim Participation at the International Criminal Court: A Triumph of 
Hope over Experience’, in Dominick McGoldrick, Peter Rowe and Eric Donnelly (eds.), The 
Permanent International Criminal Court, (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2004) p. 315; Christine H. Chung, 
‘Victims’ Participation at the International Criminal Court: Are Concessions of the Court Clouding the 
Promise?’, 6(3) Northwestern Journal of International Human Rights (2008) 459-545, 459. 
concerns” of the victims “to be presented and considered at stages of the proceedings 
determined to be appropriate by the Court.”3 Article 75 also grants victims the right to 
reparations in the form of restitution, compensation and rehabilitation in the event that 
the individual accused of injuring the victims is convicted. 4  The International 
Criminal Court’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence further expand the rights of the 
victims to include the right to representation, the right to directly participate in the 
proceedings and the right to question witnesses during trial.5 Generally, victims have 
exercised these rights and played an active role in the court proceedings that have thus 
far been conducted at the Court.  
 The International Criminal Court’s position on the role of the victim in court 
proceedings represents a turning point in international law. This is evidenced by the 
fact that the foundational texts of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon and the 
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (“Extraordinary Chambers”) 
emulate the International Criminal Court by providing victims with many of the same 
rights. Victims in the Special Tribunal for Lebanon have the right to present their 
views and concerns and have them considered by the Tribunal. 6  The Special 
Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence also provide victims with the right to 
counsel, the right to call witnesses and the right to introduce evidence. 7  At the 
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, victims are authorized to 
participate as civil parties in Rules 23 and 23bis.8  That the Special Tribunal for 
                                                        
3 Article 68(3) of the International Criminal Court Statute. 
4 Article 75 of the International Criminal Court Statute. 
5 Rule 91 of the International Criminal Court Rules of Procedure and Evidence. 
6 Article 17 of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon Statute. 
7 Rules 86-87 of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon Rules of Procedure and Evidence. 
8 Rules 23 and 23bis of the Internal Rules, Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia. 
Lebanon and the Extraordinary Chambers have followed the lead of the International 
Criminal Court and adopted a participatory role for victims demonstrates a clear trend 
in international criminal law. 
 The victim’s right to participation at the International Criminal Court is not 
unfettered.  A victim may only participate in trial when their personal interests are 
affected.9 The Court also has the discretion to permit a victim to participate “when the 
court deems it appropriate.”10  The victim may express his or her views and concerns, 
but only to the extent that they are “not prejudicial to or inconsistent with the rights of 
the accused and a fair and impartial trial”.11 Finally, victims do not have complete 
access to the evidence and are limited to what extent that they may participate in the 
investigation process.12  These restrictions leave the victim’s exercise of his or her 
participatory right to the discretion of the court, contingent on how broadly or 
narrowly the court chooses to interpret what evidence affects a victim’s personal 
rights.13  Such limitations are not per se unreasonable, but they are also likely to 
diminish the relief felt by participating victims.14  Dissatisfaction on the part of victim 
participants is often a result of the perception that the criminal justice system 
                                                        
9 Article 68(3) of the International Criminal Court Statute. 
10 Article 68(3) of the International Criminal Court Statute; William Schabas, An Introduction to the 
International Criminal Court (4th Edition, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2011) p. 347. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Haslam, supra note 2, p. 323. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid., p. 324. 
disproportionately focuses on the defendant and fails to adequately account for the 
needs of the victims.15  
2 The Goals of Victim Participation and International Criminal Trials 
 Victim participation can serve a number of purposes that do not relate to the 
conviction of the accused.  Reasons advanced in support of victim participation 
include: determining the truth, individual and collective healing, morality, the 
reintegration of the criminal into the community and victim reparations.16  Of these 
goals, the search for truth is the most prominent in the context of the trial.  The other 
identified goals are typically satisfied through a comprehensive and robust truth-
telling process.  Therefore, the search for truth is an overarching goal that enables the 
other victim-oriented purposes for trial to be fulfilled.  The importance of establishing 
the truth cannot be overstated.  As the representative for the Office of Public Counsel 
for Victims stated during closing statements in the Lubanga trial, “the essential 
concern of the victims participating in this trial, over and beyond the conviction of the 
accused, is therefore to contribute to the establishment of the truth, seeking for the 
truth and establishing the truth.”17 
 In this context, it is necessary to distinguish the role of victim as witness from 
                                                        
15 Mina Rauschenbach and Damien Scalia, ‘Victims and International Criminal Justice: A Vexed 
Question?’, 90(870) International Review of the Red Cross (2008) 441-459, 447.  
16 Haslam, supra note 2, p. 325; citing Claude Jorda and Jerome de Hemptinne, ‘The Status and Role of 
the Victim’, in Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta and John R.W.D. Jones (eds.), The Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court: A Commentary, Vol. 2 (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002) pp. 
1400-01. 
17 The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, 25 August 2011, International Criminal Court, Trial 
Transcript, ICC-01/04-01/06, p. 62, lines 2-5, <www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1210316.pdf>, 22 
February 2016. 
the role of victim as participant.  There is no question that the participation of victims 
as witnesses at trial often plays a significant part in the conviction of the accused. 
Victims are often in the best position to give the most persuasive evidence against the 
accused due to their close proximity to the alleged incidents that are the subject of the 
trial. However, victims acting only as witnesses primarily serve the interests of the 
Prosecution, and not themselves, and those interests do not necessarily coincide.18 
Conversely, victim participants are capable of presenting and examining evidence 
from their own unique perspective and for their own purposes, rather than being 
constrained by the goals the Prosecution hopes to achieve through trial.19 
 There are a variety of reasons to conduct an international criminal trial, some 
of which overlap with the reasons underlying victim participation. These goals can be 
divided into the judicial and the political. The judicial purposes of trial are to assess 
the evidence against the accused and to determine his or her guilt or innocence.  The 
political goals include: the search for truth through the creation of an historical record, 
promoting the rule of law as a way of achieving long-term peace and stability and 
providing victims with a sense of closure.
20 These purposes exist on a spectrum. On 
one end is the purely legal trial, limited in scope to a determination of the guilt or 
innocence of the accused based on the evidence as assessed following the application 
                                                        
18 Mariana Pena and Gaelle Carayon, ‘Is the ICC Making the Most of Victim Participation?’, 7 The 
International Journal of Transitional Justice (2013) 518-535, 520. 
19 Christine Van den Wyngaert, “Victims Before International Criminal Courts: Some Views and 
Concerns of an ICC Judge’, 44 Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law (2011) 475-496, 
487. 
20 Jenia Iontcheva Turner, ‘Defense Perspectives on Law and Politics in International Criminal Trials’, 
48 Virginia Journal of International Law (2007-08) 529-594, 533-34, 536. 
of the accused’s fair trial rights.21 At the other end is a ‘show trial’ in which all those 
involved assume the guilt of the accused in advance of trial and which is held largely 
to silence the political opponents of the group conducting the trial.22  
 The International Criminal Court fall somewhere along this spectrum as the 
Court seeks to balance its judicial and political functions during trial. Determining the 
individual criminal liability of the defendant is clearly the Court’s most important 
judicial function. The primary political goal of the Court is less well defined, although 
the Statute’s emphasis on victims’ rights suggests a predilection in favour of the 
interests of the victims, the most important of which is the search for truth.23 The 
victims’ interest in the truth was specifically recognised by Pre-Trial Chamber I, 
which also confirmed that proceedings at the International Criminal Court are capable 
of satisfying that interest. 24  This also fits with the Court’s overall obligation “to 
establish the truth” as described by the Lubanga court.25  That is not to say that the 
                                                        
21 Eric A. Posner, ‘Political Trials in Domestic and International Law’, 55 Duke Law Journal (2005-
2006) 75-152, 82 
22 Turner, supra note 22, pp. 533-34; see also Kirsten Campbell, ‘The Making of Global Legal Culture 
and International Criminal Law’, 26 Leiden Journal of International Law (2013) 155-172, 164.  
23 M.M. de Guzman and W.A. Schabas, ‘Initiation of Investigations and Selection of Cases’, in Göran 
Sluiter, Håkan Friman, Suzannah Linton, Sergey Vasiliev, Salvatore Zappalà (eds.), International 
Criminal Procedure: Principles and Rules, (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013) p. 163; Carsten 
Stahn, The Law and Practice of the International Criminal Court, (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2015) p. 384. 
24 Prosecutor v. Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui, 13 May 2008, International Criminal Court, Decision on 
the Set of Procedural Rights Attached to Procedural Status of Victim at the Pre-Trial Stage of the Case, 
ICC-01/04-01/07-474, paras. 31-36, <www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc486390.pdf>, 22 February 2016.  
25 The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, 18 January 2008, International Criminal Court, Decision 
on Victims’ Participation, ICC-01/04-01/06-1119, para. 133, <www.icccpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc409168. 
Court has developed an explicit policy in favor of satisfying the victims’ interest in 
establishing the truth.  The Court’s main function is, and will likely remain, 
determining the guilt or innocence of the defendant. However, the practise of the 
Court indicates that the victims’ interest in the truth can also play an important role in 
the trial process. 
Determining the truth is clearly an important goal underlying both victim participation 
and international criminal trials.  However, some commentators are concerned that the 
sort of truth produced by the legal process is necessarily incomplete.26 Emily Haslam 
argues that truth in the context of trial is limited to the extent that some facts may be 
important to the victim but irrelevant to the charges against the defendant and other 
facts may be uncontested.27 Little or no evidence will be introduced at trial relating to 
issues that fall into either category foreclosing the possibility that the truth can be 
established as it relates to those areas. Haslam also suggests that that the sorts of 
questions asked of witnesses prevent some facts from being included in the historical 
record.28  
Similar concerns have also been expressed about the ability of a trial to develop an 
adequate historical record.  Judges are not trained historians and their primary 
responsibility is to adjudicate the case at bar and not to establish historical truths.29 
Mirjan Damaška suggests that courts are constrained by the necessity that evidence 
                                                                                                                                                              
PDF>, 28 June 2015. 
26 Haslam supra n. 2 at 328-29. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Leila Sadat Wexler, ‘Reflections on the Trial of Vichy Collaborator Paul Touvier for Crimes Against 
Humanity’, 20 Law and Social Inquiry (1995) 191-222, at 215. 
introduced at trial must be relevant to the crimes charged.30 The requirement that 
evidence be relevant can lead to the omission from the record of facts relating to the 
actions of individuals or organisations not on trial, or facts that are considered too 
remote in time to have a bearing on the proceedings.31 This results in the historical 
record being viewed through the filter of legal rules and procedure rather than being 
evaluated on its merits.32 
An additional barrier to developing an accurate historical record is the binary nature 
of the adversarial criminal trial as practised at the International Criminal Court.33  
This form of trial necessarily limits the consideration of the facts to the “clash of bias 
and counter-bias”, which is thought to inhibit the discovery of historical truth.34  That 
is, the facts creating the historical record only represent two perspectives, the 
prosecution and the defence, and do not encompass the multiplicity of viewpoints 
normally preferred by historians.35 Both the prosecution and the defence are interested 
in introducing evidence that is favourable to their own position, omitting seemingly 
neutral information that may not be relevant to the case at bar, but are significant to 
understanding the historical record as a whole.36     
Direct victim participation is one way to alleviate (but not eliminate) these concerns.  
                                                        
30 Mirjan Damaška, ‘What is the Point of International Criminal Justice?’, 83 Chicago-Kent Law 
Review (2008) 329-365, at 336. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Lawrence Douglas, The Memory of Judgment (London, Yale University Press, 2001) p. 75. 
33 Damaška, supra note 30, p. 337. 
34 Ibid., citing Susan Haack, ‘Epistemology Legalized: Or, Truth, Justice, and the American Way’, 49 
American Journal of Jurisprudence (2004) 43-62, at 49.  
35 Damaška, supra note 30, p. 337. 
36 Ibid. 
Victim participation introduces a third perspective into the trial process allowing for a 
fuller understanding of the truth of the situation and the creation of a more accurate 
historical record. A participating victim can attempt to inquire into those areas that the 
other parties are disinclined to explore.  The ability to launch such an inquiry is of 
course limited by the procedural restrictions discussed above; nonetheless, the right to 
participate provides victims with the opportunity to determine the truth to an extent 
previously unknown in international criminal law.     
3  The Modality of Victim Participation at the International Criminal Court 
 To understand the contribution victims have made to the trial process at the 
International Criminal Court, it is necessary to examine what distinct rights the 
victims have as participants. Although Article 68(c) confers upon the victims the right 
to have their views and concerns presented during proceedings, it is silent as to how 
that presentation should occur. Thus far, the manner in which victims are permitted to 
participate is determined on a case-by-case basis.    
 The Court first took up the task of delineating the proper participatory role of 
victims during trial prior to the commencement of the Lubanga trial. Although the 
modality of victim participation had been much debated during the negotiation of the 
Rome Statute, and had been addressed by the Pre-Trial Chambers, it had not yet been 
addressed in the trial context.  Trial Chamber I recalled that victim participation is 
contingent upon whether the personal interests of the alleged victim are implicated.37 
The Trial Chamber indicated that an individual victim could only participate if the 
victim submitted a written applications specifying “why his or her interests are 
                                                        
37 The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, 18 January 2008, International Criminal Court, Decision 
on Victims’ Participation, ICC-01/04-01/06-1119, para. 93, <www.icccpi.int/ 
iccdocs/doc/doc409168.PDF>, 28 June 2015 (“Lubanga Victim Participation Decision”).  
affected by the evidence or issue then arising in the case” and delineating the nature 
and the extent of the proposed participation.38 The Trial Chamber clarified that a 
general interest in the outcome of the case and/or the evidence being presented before 
the chamber would likely be insufficient to permit the victim to participate.39   
 The Lubanga Court also explicitly recognised the important role that victim 
participants can play in the ascertainment of the truth. The Trial Chamber held that 
pursuant to its Article 69(3) authority it could “request the submission of all evidence 
that it considers necessary for the determination of the truth” and that any participant, 
including the victims, could be a source of such evidence.40  From that authority the 
Chamber extrapolated a right held by victim participants to “tender and examine 
evidence” if doing so will assist in determining the truth.41  The Appeals Chamber 
upheld the decision on the grounds that victim participation would be ineffective if 
the victims were not able to present evidence relating to the accused’s guilt or 
innocence or to challenge the admissibility or relevance of the evidence.42  However, 
the Appeals Chamber made it clear that the right would not be unfettered as victims 
wishing to introduce evidence are still required to meet the requirements of Article 
68(3).43 
                                                        
38 Ibid., para. 96. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid., para. 108. 
41 Ibid. 
42 The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, 11 July 2008, International Criminal Court, Judgment on 
the Appeals of The Prosecutor and The Defence Against Trial Chamber I's Decision on Victims' 
Participation of 18 January 2008, ICC-01/04-01/06, paras. 97, 105, <www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc529076.PDF>, 14 December 2015.  
43 Ibid., paras. 99 and 101. 
 This decision was not free from controversy.  Judge Kirsh, in his partial 
dissenting opinion to the Appeals Chamber’s decision, argued against the introduction 
of evidence by victim participants, finding that the Statute and the Rules do not 
contain any disclosure obligation applicable to victims.44  He further argued that the 
absence of such an obligation, which exists to ensure the fairness of proceedings, 
demonstrates that the drafters of the Statute and the Rules did not envisage the victim 
participants introducing evidence relevant to the guilt or innocence of the accused.45 
Judge Pikis also partially dissented from the Appeals Chamber’s decision and asserted 
that the Statute limits participation in the proof or disproof of the charges to the 
parties, i.e. the prosecution and the accused, and does not permit victims to participate 
in that inquiry.46 It has also been suggested that permitting victim participants to 
introduce evidence during trial exceeds the limits on participation contained in the 
Statute and the Rules of Evidence and fails to properly protect the rights of the 
accused, which the Statute places in a superior position to the participation rights of 
the victims.47 While these arguments have some validity, they do not challenge the 
basic premise of the Trial Chamber’s decision recognising both the paramount 
                                                        
44 The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, 11 July 2008, International Criminal Court, Judgment on 
the Appeals of The Prosecutor and the Defence Against Trial Chamber I's Decision on Victims' 
Participation of 18 January 2008, Partially Dissenting Opinion of Judge Kirsh, ICC-01/04-01/06, para. 
16, <www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc534776.pdf>, 7 December 2015. 
45 Ibid. 
46 The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, No. 11 July 2008, International Criminal Court, 
Judgment on the Appeals of The Prosecutor and The Defence Against Trial Chamber I's Decision on 
Victims' Participation of 18 January 2008, Partially Dissenting Opinion of Judge Pikis, ICC-01/04-
01/06, para. 6, <www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc529076.PDF>, 14 December 2015.  
47 Chung, supra note 2, 459, 519.  
importance of determining the truth and the important truth-telling role played by the 
victims as a participant in the trial.  Rather, they only challenge the modality by which 
that purpose is achieved leaving the underlying basis for the decision undisturbed. 
 Each subsequent Trial Chamber ruling on the issue of victim participation has 
largely followed the lead of the Lubanga Appeals Chamber; but each has also applied 
the holding of the Appeals Chamber in a manner that the deciding Chamber 
considered more suitable for the case under consideration. The Katanga and Ngudjolo 
case provided the Court with its first opportunity after the Lubanga Appeals Chamber 
decision to consider the participation of victims during trial. Trial Chamber II took 
notice of the concerns expressed about the Appeals Chamber’s decision and made 
clear that victims could participate only to the extent that their involvement would 
contribute to the determination of the truth, did not prejudice the rights of the accused, 
and did not slow down the trial process.48 The victims were permitted to question 
witnesses, but had to submit an application to participate before each witness testified 
and the victims could be required to provide the parties with an advance draft of the 
written questions they wished to ask.49  It is notable that the Katanga and Ngudjolo 
Court considered it appropriate to require the representatives of the victims to submit 
the questions they would like to pose in advance as exactly one year earlier, during 
the Lubanga case, Judge Fulford specifically rejected the notion that the victim 
participants be required to produce a list of questions in advance of examining a 
                                                        
48 The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Matthew Ngudjolo Chui, 22 January 2010, International 
Criminal Court, Decision on the Modalities of Victim Participation at Trial, ICC-01/04-01/07-1788-
tENG, para. 65, <www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc831030.pdf>, 28 June 2015, (“Katanga and 
Ngudjolo Victim’s Participation Decision”). 
49 Ibid., at para. 72. 
witness as ‘unrealistic’ and ‘absurd.’50 
 Trial Chamber II asserted its right to dictate to the victims the order and 
manner in which their proposed questions were asked and retained the prerogative to 
itself to put those questions to the witnesses instead of allowing the victims’ legal 
representative to do so.51 Questioning by the victims was limited to issues relating to 
the victims’ individual interests and concerns and could only be used to supplement or 
clarify the witness’ testimony.52 The Trial Chamber also recognised the possibility 
that a victim might submit incriminating or exculpatory evidence, but reiterated that 
such a submission would be contingent on the outcome of a weighing of the victim’s 
interests, the rights of the accused and the requirements of a fair and impartial trial.53 
 In The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Trial Chamber III set out ten 
issues that had to be addressed by a victim in his or her application to present 
evidence. Those issues ranged from the type of evidence to be introduced, the manner 
of introduction, the time needed to introduce it, the effect the evidence had on the 
personal interests of the victims, the relevance of the proposed evidence, how the 
evidence would assist the Chamber in determining the truth, whether a victim 
proposed as a witness had relinquished his or her anonymity, the effect the evidence 
would have on the fair trial rights of the accused, any disclosure issues that needed to 
be resolved, whether protective measures might be needed and whether the evidence 
                                                        
50 The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, 22 January 2009, International Criminal Court, Trial 
Transcript, ICC-01/04-01/06-T-177-RED-ENG, p. 21, lines 8-10. <www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1301969.pdf>, 28 June 2015. 
51 See Katanga and Ngudjolo Victim’s Participation Decision, supra note 48, para. 73. 
52 Ibid., paras. 74, 78. 
53 Ibid., para. 83. 
would be presented by an individual authorized to participate as a victim.54 These 
requirements expanded the information identified by the Lubanga Trial Chamber as 
necessary information to be contained in an application to participate.  The Bemba 
Trial Chamber also identified a mechanism whereby a victim participant could 
present his or her views and concerns, either orally or in writing, and which permitted 
the victim to present those views and concerns as unsworn.55  
 The Trial Chamber in the Ruto and Sang case set its own unique rules for the 
presentation of evidence by the victims. In Ruto and Sang, the Trial Chamber 
determined that the Office of Public Counsel for Victims, rather than the Common 
Legal Representative for the victims, would question witnesses on behalf of the 
victims, unless the Common Legal Representative was authorized to appear in 
person. 56  Questioning was limited to subjects that were relevant to the victims’ 
interests, questions could not repeat those already asked by the party calling the 
witness, the form of the question could not be leading and no new allegations could 
be raised.57 The Common Legal Representative could submit an application to present 
evidence that would be considered and determined on the basis of whether “the 
proposed evidence is relevant to the personal interests of victims, may contribute to 
the determination of the truth and whether it would be consistent with the rights of the 
                                                        
54 The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, 21 November 2011, International Criminal Court, 
Order regarding applications by victims to present their views and concerns or to present evidence, 
ICC-01/05-01/08-1935, para. 3(b), <www.icccpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1274199.pdf>, 28 June 2015.  
55 Ibid., para. 3(c). 
56 The Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto and Joshua Arap Sang, 3 October 2012, International 
Criminal Court, Decision on Victims’ Representation and Participation, ICC-01/09-01/11-460, para. 
75, <www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1479374.pdf>, 28 June 2015.  
57 Ibid., para. 75-76. 
accused and a fair and impartial trial.”58 Trial Chamber V imposed identical rules on 
victims wishing to present evidence in the Kenyatta and Muthaura case.59  
 Sitting in the Ntaganda case, Trial Chamber VI introduced a relatively 
restrictive victim participation regime.  The Trial Chamber required victims wishing 
to question a particular witness to submit an application requesting permission to do 
so.60  The application had to be submitted at least four days before the witness was 
expected to testify, it had to identify the specific topics about which the victim’s 
representative wished to inquire and the victims had to orally renew their request 
during court proceedings following the prosecution’s questioning of the witness.61 
The victims also had to indicate whether their counsel intended to question the 
witness about reparations and whether the victims intended to show the witness any 
documents or other materials during the questioning.62 Finally, if the victims wished 
to present testimonial or written evidence independent of witnesses called by the 
prosecution or the defense, they were required to submit an application to that effect 
within two days of the prosecution concluding the presentation of its evidence.63 
Under these rules, the victims were allowed to question witnesses and introduce 
                                                        
58 Ibid., para. 77. 
59  The Prosecutor v. Francis Kirimi Muthaura and Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, 3 October 2012, 
International Criminal Court, Decision on Victims’ Representation and Participation, ICC-01/09-
02/11-498, paras. 72-76, <www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1479387.pdf>, 28 June 2015. 
60 The Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, 2 June 2015, International Criminal Court, Decision on the 
Conduct of Proceedings, ICC-01/04-02/06 411 619, para. 64, < www.icccpi.int/iccdocs/doc/ 
doc1986921.pdf>, 22 February 2016. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Ibid., paras. 67-68. 
63 Ibid., paras. 69-70. 
evidence, but in a more circumscribed manner than that permitted by the procedure 
set out in the Lubanga case.  In particular, the Ntaganda Trial Chamber imposed 
rather strict time limits on the victims in which to identify the nature and degree of 
their proposed participation.     
 Since the decision of the Appeals Chamber in the Lubanga case affirmed the 
rights of the victims to question witnesses during trial and introduce evidence relating 
to the guilt or innocence of the accused, the subsequent Trial Chamber decisions 
regarding victim participation have sought to respect that decision while 
simultaneously imposing restrictions on those same rights within the construct of the 
Appeals Chamber’s decision. These subsequent rulings complied with the letter, but 
not the spirit of the Appeals Chamber’s ruling. Further, each Trial Chamber 
introduced its own approach to victim participation preventing the development of a 
unified practice as to how victims participate in proceedings. Therefore, although the 
right of the victims to participate in the proceedings has been confirmed, the actual 
exercise of those rights has been circumscribed. 
4 The Impact of Evidence Introduced by the Victims on the Conviction of 
 Thomas Lubanga 
 
 Any valid evaluation of the impact victim participation has had during trials at 
the International Criminal Court must be limited to a consideration of those cases in 
which a guilty verdict has been rendered. One can only determine the effective role 
played by the victims in court proceedings by looking at the court’s decisions and 
weighing the significance of victim participation on the court’s final verdict.  As the 
evidence introduced by the victims is generally inculpatory, a not guilty verdict, by its 
very nature, demonstrates that the victims’ participation was not adequate to meet the 
judicial goals of trial.  Therefore, consideration of this issue is confined to the 
Lubanga and Katanga decisions. 
 As in any criminal case, the burden of producing the evidence against the 
accused at the International Criminal Court is the responsibility of the Prosecution. 
However, the victims’ right to participate in the trial grants them the ability to present 
additional evidence and legal arguments that can be considered by the Trial Chamber 
when reaching its verdict. If victim participation is to have any meaning, the victim 
must take advantage of this enhanced status and directly participate in presenting or 
eliciting evidence that leads to the conviction of the accused. Failure by the victim to 
present evidence drastically reduces the significance of the right to victim 
participation, as there is no change in how the trial is conducted. 
 In Lubanga, the Defendant, Thomas Lubanga, was convicted on 14 March 
2012 of conscripting and enlisting children under the age of fifteen into the Union de 
Patriotes Congolais (“UPC”) and the Forces Patriotiques pour la libération du 
Congo (“FPLC”) and using those children to actively participate in hostilities 
pursuant to Article 8(2)(e)(vii) and Article 25(3)(a) of the Rome Statute.64 There is no 
indication in the Trial Chamber’s Decision, or the trial transcripts, that evidence 
introduced by victim participants in the Lubanga case had any bearing on the final 
verdict.  This conclusion is borne out by an examination of the evidence relied on by 
the Trial Chamber when reaching its verdict. With regard to the finding that the 
accused engaged in conscription and enlistment of children under the age of fifteen 
and the use of those children as active participants in hostilities, the Trial Chamber 
specifically found that the testimony of numerous witnesses called by the Prosecution, 
in addition to physical evidence introduced by the Prosecution, established the 
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elements of the crime beyond reasonable doubt.65           
 A review of the Judgment and the transcripts of the proceedings demonstrates 
that all of the conclusive evidence relied on by the Chamber in reaching its verdict 
was introduced by the Prosecution and not the victims. The Trial Chamber 
specifically identified twelve witnesses in its decision who provided persuasive 
testimony relating to conscription and enlistment and the active use of child soldiers 
in hostilities.66 The Prosecution called ten of those witnesses and the Defence called 
the other two. Of those twelve witnesses, the victim participants questioned only four.  
Of those four, only two, Witness P-0046 and Witness P-0055, were questioned by the 
victim participants about the recruitment of children under fifteen and the use of those 
children in active hostilities. The bulk of Witness P-0055’s testimony in response to 
victim participant questioning related to the general structure and organization of the 
Union de Patriotes Congolais and the Forces Patriotiques pour la Libération du 
Congo, although Witness P-0055 did testify that children under the age of fifteen 
served as bodyguards in those organizations.67 While that testimony was relevant to 
the charges, it had already been elicited during the Prosecution’s questioning, and in 
much greater detail than that given in response to the victim participants’ questions.68 
 Witness P-0046 was the only witness that the victim participants substantially 
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questioned with regard to the recruitment of children under the age of fifteen and the 
use of those children in active hostilities. Pursuant to questioning by the 
representatives of the victims, Witness P-0046’s testimony addressed several different 
areas including the conditions under which children were recruited by the Union de 
Patriotes Congolais and the Forces Patriotiques pour la Libération du Congo; 69 the 
living conditions experienced by children during training and active military 
deployment;70 the murder of children and other threats made against children wishing 
to leave the Union de Patriotes Congolais and the Forces Patriotiques pour la 
Libération du Congo following recruitment; 71  the condition of children and the 
attitude of families and the community after those children left military service;72 that 
Witness P-0046 had personally informed Mr Lubanga that it was illegal to recruit 
child soldiers;73 and the sexual violence experienced by some female child soldiers.74 
 In reaching its verdict, the Trial Chamber found that Witness P-0046 testified 
reliably about a number of subjects including: the age of children recruited into the 
Union de Patriotes Congolais and the Forces Patriotiques pour la Libération du 
Congo; 75  that children trained at the Rwampara Camp; 76  that children were 
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voluntarily or forcibly recruited into the Union de Patriotes Congolais and the Forces 
Patriotiques pour la Libération du Congo, and sent to serve at the headquarters of the 
Union de Patriotes Congolais and the Forces Patriotiques pour la Libération du 
Congo in Bunia or training camps located Rwampara, Mandro and Mongbwalu;77 that 
children were deployed as soldiers in Bunia, Tchoia, Kasenyi, Bogoro and 
elsewhere;78 that children took part in fighting at Kobu, Songolo and Mongbwalu;79 
that the demobilisation orders issued pertaining to children were not properly 
implemented; 80  that Mr Lubanga was directly involved in recruiting soldiers 
generally, although the evidence did not support a finding that Mr Lubanga was 
directly involved in recruiting children as soldiers;81 and that recruitment took place 
in the spring and summer of 2002.82    
 There is very little overlap between the evidence identified by the Trial 
Chamber as contributing to Mr Lubanga’s conviction, and the testimony elicited by 
the victims’ representatives during their examination of Witness P-0046. The 
questions posed by the victims’ representatives largely focused on the general 
situation of the recruitment and deployment of child soldiers in the Ituri Province of 
the Democratic Republic of Congo and did not focus specifically on Mr Lubanga’s 
involvement in those activities. In fact, the only time Mr Lubanga was mentioned in 
conjunction with a question posed by a legal representative of a victim was to indicate 
that Witness P-0046 personally told Mr Lubanga that it was illegal to recruit and use 
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child soldiers in active hostilities.83 Therefore, it can be concluded that Witness P-
0046’s answers to the questions of the legal representatives of the victims had little 
bearing on Mr Lubanga’s conviction. As Witness P-0046 was the only witness 
questioned extensively by the victims about the recruitment and use of children in 
active hostilities it can also be concluded that the testimony produced pursuant to the 
questioning of the victim participants pertaining to the recruitment and use of child 
soldiers did not contribute to Mr Lubanga’s conviction.    
 It also does not appear as if the testimony elicited by the victim participants 
contributed to Trial Chamber I’s finding that Mr Lubanga was guilty pursuant to 
Article 25(3)(a). Under Article 25(3)(a), the Trial Chamber concluded that the 
evidence supported a finding that Mr Lubanga entered into an agreement and 
participated in a common plan to build an effective army to ensure military and 
political control over the Ituri province of the Democratic Republic of Congo.84 The 
conscription and enlistment of children under the age of fifteen and the use of those 
children as participants in active hostilities was a consequence of this common plan.85  
 In reaching its conclusion with regard to Article 25(3)(a), the Trial Chamber 
considered the testimony of sixteen different witnesses and numerous items of 
physical evidence submitted by the Prosecution and the Defence. Only two witnesses 
gave testimony in response to questioning by the legal representatives of the victims 
that might have contributed to Mr Lubanga’s conviction under Article 25(3)(a). 
Witness P-0041 testified generally about financial and material aid provided to the 
Union de Patriotes Congolais but did not mention how Mr Lubanga was involved, if 
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at all, in either area.86 Witness P-0055 testified about the military structure of the 
Union de Patriotes Congolais generally, and in particular areas of Ituri, but failed to 
link Mr Lubanga to that structure.87 While this testimony may have helped create a 
general understanding as to how the Union de Patriotes Congolais and the Forces 
Patriotiques pour la Libération du Congo operated, it is very difficult to see how that 
testimony might have contributed to a finding that Mr Lubanga participated in the 
type of common plan for which he was convicted.    
 Based on the nature of the evidence, it is again reasonable to conclude that the 
testimony introduced through questioning by the victims’ representatives did not 
contribute to Mr Lubanga’s conviction. The testimony did, however, help to achieve 
some of the goals of victim participation and the non-judicial goals of the 
International Criminal Court. Specifically, the testimony represented the search for 
truth through the development of a historical record, and has hopefully brought a 
sense of healing and closure to the victims.   
 The historical record was augmented by the testimony of Witness P-0012, 
Witness P-0030, Witness P-0041, Witness P-0046, and Witness P-0055. The most 
significant of these contributions came from Witness P-0046 and her extensive 
testimony in response to the victims’ questions regarding the general conditions that 
child soldiers in the Union de Patriotes Congolais and the Forces Patriotiques pour 
la Libération du Congo were subjected to, instances of rape involving female child 
soldiers, the difficulties faced by former child soldiers when reintegrating themselves 
                                                        
86 The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, 12 February 2009, International Criminal Court, Trial 
Transcript, ICC-01/04-01/06-T-125-ENG, p. 73, lines 2 to 25 p. 74, lines 1-4, <www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc632753.pdf>, 30 June 2015 (“Witness P-0041 Transcript”). 
87 See Witness P-0055 Transcript, supra note 67, p. 23 lines 17 to p. 27, line 16, p. 28, line 18 to p. 42, 
line 10. 
into their families and communities, and the use of murder and other threats to coerce 
children into continuing to serve as child soldiers.88 The same is true of Witness P-
0012 and Witness P-0030 and their statements about Eloy Mafuta Savo and his 
double role as political and military advisor to the Union de Patriotes Congolais and 
the Forces Patriotiques pour la Libération du Congo, as well as the assistance he 
provided in financing those organizations. 89  Without this testimony, Mr Savo’s 
apparently important involvement in the Union de Patriotes Congolais and the Forces 
Patriotiques pour la Libération du Congo may have gone undiscovered. Finally, the 
testimony of Witness P-0041 and Witness P-0055 also contributed to the development 
of the historical record as it helped to further delineate the structure of the Union de 
Patriotes Congolais and the Forces Patriotiques pour la Libération du Congo and 
identify sources of financial and material aid.90   
 The testimony of these witnesses did not relate to any of the elements of the 
crimes for which Mr Lubanga was convicted. It does, however, serve an important 
truth-telling function and add to the historical record of regarding the use child 
soldiers in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Therefore, although the direct 
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participation of the victims did not directly lead to Mr Lubanga’s conviction, it did 
make an important contribution to the non-judicial goals international criminal trial 
process. 
5  The Impact of Evidence Introduced by the Victims on the Conviction of 
 Germain Katanga 
 
 Victim participants played a much larger role in the conviction of Germain 
Katanga than they had in the Lubanga case. Germain Katanga was found guilty on 7 
March 2014 of five different crimes including murder as both a war crime and a crime 
against humanity (Article 7(1)(a) and Article 8(2)(c)(1)), the war crimes of attacking a 
civilian population (Article 8(2)(e)(1)), pillaging (Article 8(2)(e)(v)) and the 
destruction of enemy property (Article 8(2)(e)(xii)).91 Mr Katanga was convicted as 
an accessory to the commission of these crimes pursuant to Article 25(3)(d) due to his 
contribution to crimes committed by others. All of Mr Katanga’s crimes were 
committed on or around 24 February 2003 in Bogoro in the Ituri province of the 
Democratic Republic of Congo.  
 In its decision, Trial Chamber II identified thirty-seven witnesses, including 
Mr Katanga and Mr Ngudjolo, who provided credible testimony about the five crimes 
Mr Katanga was convicted of, as well as his mode of liability. The representatives of 
the victims questioned at least twenty-seven of those thirty-seven witnesses during 
trial.92 That constitutes 73 per cent of the witnesses that the court identified as having 
provided evidence leading to Mr Katanga’s conviction, as opposed to only 38 per cent 
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in the Lubanga case. Further, for the first time in the international context, two 
victims were examined about their experiences by their own legal representatives 
rather than by the prosecution. This shows significantly greater involvement by the 
victims’ representatives in the Katanga case. 
 One reason for the victims’ representatives’ greater involvement during the 
Katanga trial is that different counsel represented two separate groups of victims. One 
group of lawyers represented the victims of the attack on Bogoro and another group 
acted on behalf of former child soldier victims. Because two distinct victims’ groups 
were involved in the trial, each with different concerns, the lawyers representing each 
group were permitted to question the witnesses separately. Therefore, the witnesses 
were exposed to two sets of questions from two different lawyers resulting in more of 
the witnesses being questioned by the representatives of the victims. 
 The procedural obstacles implemented by the Katanga and Ngudjolo Trial 
Chamber in its ‘Decision on the Modalities of Victim Participation’ did not hinder 
victims’ participation. In Katanga, the victim participants not only had to indicate that 
they wished to question a particular witness, but also had to submit in advance a list 
of the questions they intended to ask.  In essence, the representatives of the victims 
were required to formulate their questions for each witness based on pre-trial 
statements and without the benefit of hearing the witness’s testimony on direct 
examination and cross-examination. This procedure was further complicated by the 
fact that the victims’ representatives were forbidden from questioning the witnesses 
about issues already raised by the prosecution, except to the extent that the victims’ 
representatives sought clarification of that earlier testimony. These rules resulted in 
the victims’ representatives working from pre-prepared lists of questions that had to 
be edited to account for questions already asked by the parties. Despite this difficult 
task, the representatives of the victims still managed to adduce relevant evidence that 
helped contribute to Mr Katanga’s conviction. 
 In Katanga, the testimony arising out of questioning by the victims’ 
representatives was much more relevant to the elements of the crimes charged than in 
Lubanga. Of the twenty-seven witnesses questioned by the victims’ representatives, 
fifteen of them recounted evidence directly relating to the murder of, and attacks on, 
civilians, the destruction of property and the pillaging of property. Witness D02-176 
testified that civilians were attacked and killed during the assault on Bogoro and that 
people seeking refuge at the Bogoro Institute were killed inside the building. 93 
Witness V-4, one of the victim participants who testified, described her experience 
inside the Bogoro Institute and her recollection of seeing civilians attacked with 
machetes as she fled from the Institute.94 Witness P-249 and Witness P-317 both 
elaborated on testimony given during their direct examination that civilians had been 
murdered and injured during the attack.95    
 Multiple witnesses also testified about the extent of the destruction of property 
and the pillaging that took place. Both victim participants, Witness V-2 and Witness 
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V-4, testified that their houses were destroyed during the attack and that their 
livestock was stolen. 96  A third victim, Witness P-166, called to testify by the 
prosecution, testified in response to victim participant questions that his house was 
destroyed during the attack.97 Witnesses P-12, P-28, P-249, P-268, P-323, D02-01, 
D02-129 all testified that houses in Bogoro were destroyed during the attack. 98 
Additionally, the two victim participants that also testified both specifically named 
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Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo as the individuals responsible for the attack 
on Bogoro.99   
 It is unlikely that the testimony elicited by the representatives of the victim 
participants, taken alone, would have been sufficient to convict Germain Katanga. 
However, the nature of the evidence elicited by the victims’ legal representatives 
clearly contributed to the Trial Chamber’s finding of guilt.  Testimony responsive to 
questions posed by the legal representatives of the victims directly addressed 
important elements of the crimes for which Mr Katanga was convicted including 
evidence of murder, violent attacks on civilians, the destruction of houses in Bogoro 
and the pillaging of personal property. The evidence introduced by the victims was 
largely restricted to those areas and did not address Mr Katanga’s participation in the 
common plan which led to the commission of the crimes charged.  This can be 
explained by recalling that victim questioning is limited to those issues directly 
relating to the individual victims. The structure of Mr Katanga’s political group had 
little bearing on victim related issues. Therefore, it is not surprising that the 
questioning by the victims’ representatives did not address the modality of Mr 
Katanga’s criminal responsibility. 
 Unlike in the Lubanga case, the testimony elicited in response to the 
questioning by the victims’ legal representatives in the Katanga case achieved both 
the judicial and political goals of trial. In Katanga, the victim participants questioned 
more witnesses, asked more questions and extracted more substantive evidence. Two 
factors led to this result.  First, Mr Katanga was accused of a greater variety of crimes 
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than Mr Lubanga, allowing for inquiry into more factual areas. Second, as the second 
trial held at the International Criminal Court, the representatives of the victims in 
Katanga had observed the Lubanga case and could use it as a model of how (and how 
not) to effectively fulfil their role.  This proved to be a great advantage as it allowed 
the victims’ representatives to be more aggressive in their trial participation leading to 
greater advocacy on behalf of the victims and a greater influence on the proceedings 
as a whole.  
6 Conclusion  
 The evidence reviewed suggests that the participation by the victims in the 
Lubanga trial and the Katanga trial made a positive contribution to the work of the 
Court. The judicial and political purposes of international criminal trials were on 
display in both cases with the political purpose of establishing the truth being 
particularly prominent. Although the testimony responding to victim questioning in 
Lubanga did not lead to evidence that assisted in Mr Lubanga’s conviction, it did 
contribute to the historical record in a number of factual areas. Issues of physical and 
sexual violence against child soldiers, the deleterious impact child conscription had 
on those involved and the structure of the Union de Patriotes Congolais and the 
Forces Patriotiques pour la Libération du Congo and their sources of support and 
assistance were all revealed during trial.  Providing a forum for victims to explore 
these and other issues was important although much of this evidence did not relate to 
the crimes alleged against Mr Lubanga. The presentation of this evidence was 
particularly significant in light of the criticism directed against the Office of the 
Prosecutor for failing to bring charges related to physical and sexual violence against 
children forced to serve as soldiers, as it may have provided those affected individuals 
some sense of closure even if no one was convicted of those crimes.  
 In Katanga, the testimony given in response to questions posed by the victims’ 
representatives helped to satisfy both the judicial and political goals of trial at the 
International Criminal Court in that it contributed to Mr Katanga’s conviction and 
served the truth-telling function of the court. Hopefully, the victims’ high level of 
engagement in the Katanga proceedings is indicative of a trend that as more trials 
take place at the International Criminal Court, the victims’ representatives will 
become increasingly comfortable with a more active role in proceedings and lead to 
the victim making greater contributions to the goals of the Court. The more expansive 
involvement of the victims’ representatives in the Katanga case, as demonstrated by 
the significantly larger number of witnesses questioned than in the Lubanga case, 
suggests that as additional trials are held, the more common significant victim 
participation will become.    
 It is essential that the individual Trial Chambers do not discourage victim 
participation by becoming overly restrictive in how they permit victims to participate. 
Unfortunately, the Trial Chambers appear to be following a trend of imposing 
increasingly greater restrictions on the modality of victim participation as evidenced 
by the progressively more restrictive victim participation regimes established by each 
successive Trial Chamber to rule on the issue. The growing confidence demonstrated 
by the victim participants in the Katanga case must not be undermined by overly 
obstructive procedural requirements.  While it is well within the discretion of each 
Trial Chamber to determine how evidence is presented during trial, the judges would 
do well to heed the ruling of the Appeals Chamber in Lubanga and make sure that the 
restrictions that they impose on victim participation are not so onerous as to render 
that right ineffective.  
 
